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Arbitration Under NAFTA
Chapter Eleven: Some Pragmatic
Reflections upon the First Case Filed
Against Mexico
BY CLYDE C. PEARCE* AND JACK COE, JR.**
I. Introduction
On January 1, 1994, the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA) came into effect.1 On October 2, 1996, Metalclad, an
American company,2 notified the United Mexican States (Mexico) of
its intention to seek arbitration concerning what it believed were
numerous violations of the NAFTA in relation to its investment in
the state of San Luis Potosi.' Its subsequent claim-the first to be
filed against Mexico under Chapter Eleven 4 - led to an arbitration
* Law Offices of Clyde Pearce. B.S., Brigham Young University; J.D.,
University of Utah. Mr. Pearce was lead counsel and principal advocate for the
claimant in Metalclad v. United Mexican States, and is of counsel to Oppenheimer,
Wolff, Donnelly and Bayh.
** Professor, Pepperdine School of Law. B.A., UCLA; J.D. Loyola (Los
Angeles); LL.M., Exeter; Ph.D. (Law) London School of Economics. Professor Coe
was consulting co-counsel to, and appeared for, the claimant in Metalclad v. United
Mexican States, as did Peter L. Cling, Esq., a member of the California Bar. The
authors are grateful for the helpful comments of Professor Antonio Mendoza on an
earlier draft of this article.
1. North American Free Trade Agreement, Art. 2203 [hereinafter NAFTA].
NAFTA was brought into U.S. law by the NAFTA Implementation Act, Pub. L. 103-
182,107 Stat. 2057 (1993) (codified at 19 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3473).
2. Metalclad is a publicly traded company (NASDAQ: MTLC).
3. Among other assertions, Metalclad alleged that it and its investment had not
received fair and equitable treatment within the meaning of NAFTA Article 1105
and that its investment had been indirectly expropriated within the meaning of
Article 1110 through a combination of acts and omissions attributable to the United
Mexican States under international law.
4. ARB(AF)/97/1 International Centre for the Settlement of Investment
Disputes. For general treatments of Chapter Eleven's dispute resolution regime, see
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under ICSID's5  Additional Facility Rules6  conducted by a
distinguished tribunal Metalclad sought $90 million and throughout
the proceedings, which spanned over three years,' Mexico vigorously
defended itself, employing many skillful lawyers and other specialists.
Although international arbitration has become commonplace for
transnational business, arbitration against a host state under Chapter
Eleven has several distinctive features. This Article notes those
features while presenting a pragmatic view of Chapter Eleven's
arbitration mechanism, generally from the perspective of the
claimant's counsel.9 Customarily, it treats components of the process
David A. Ganz, Resolution of Investment Disputes Under the North American Free
Trade Agreement, 10 ARIz. J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 335 (1993); Gary N. Horlick &
Amanda F. DeBusk, Dispute Resolution Under NAFTA, 27 J. WORLD TRADE 21
(1993); R. Edward Ishmael Jr., North American Free Trade Agreement: Dispute
Resolution Procedures, 2 AM. REv. INT'L AR. 455 (1991); David Price, An Overview
of the NAFTA Investment Chapter: Substantive Rules and Investor-State Dispute
Settlement, 27 INT'L LAw. 727, 731-36 (1993).
5. The acronym ICSID stands for the International Centre for the Settlement of
Investment Disputes.
6. The case was the first to commence under the Additional Facility Rules of
ICSID. See ICSID, ADDITIONAL FACILITY FOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF
CONCILIATION, ARBITRATION AND FACT-FINDING PROCEEDINGS 33 (1979) Doc.
ICSID/11 (reprinting Additional Facility Arbitration Rules) [hereinafter Additional
Facility Rules].
7. The members were Benjamin Civiletti, Esq., Professor Sir Elihu Lauterpacht
(Tribunal President), and Jose Sequieros, Esq.
8. Measured from the notice of intent to file a claim under NAFTA Article 1119
to the filing of post-hearing briefs in November, 1999. Nine additional months
elapsed before the award was transmitted to the parties.
9. Because Metalclad potentially raises a number of important substantive
questions, the case has attracted considerable attention. The respective factual and
legal arguments of the disputing parties, however, have not been widely published, a
fact reflected in some of the existing discussions of the case. See, e.g., Adam
Sulkowski, NAFTA's Indirect Expropriation Protections: Will Compensation Be
Required When Ecological Protections Are Applied? (An Analysis of Metalclad
Corporation's Claims Against Mexico), in 15(2) MEALEY'S INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION REPORT 23 (Feb. 2000) (substantial reliance on secondary sources).
Despite the temptation to explore the substance of the case in detail, that exercise
will be better undertaken in a later article now that the award has been rendered.
[Editor's Note: On August 25, 2000, the tribunal in Metalclad issued an award in
favor of the claimant. The three arbitrators joined in finding that Mexico had
indirectly expropriated the claimant's investment within the meaning of NAFTA
Article 1110 and had also failed to accord the investor fair and equitable treatment as
required by NAFTA Article 1105. Mexico was ordered to pay nearly $17 million to
the investor. Mexico has announced that it will seek nullification of the award before
the courts of British Columbia. The award can be downloaded from
www.pearcelaw.com, where further information concerning the post-award
proceedings can also be found.]
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in the order that they arise as the proceedings advance. This Article
concludes by suggesting a method of improving Chapter Eleven
arbitration.
H. Counsel's Preliminary Assessment of the Merits
Many of the protections given to an investor under NAFTA
Chapter Eleven are expressed as broad terms of art, the specific
content of which is to be gleaned through the application of standard
rules of treaty interpretation and by reference to international law."
Some of these undertakings-such as that addressed to
expropriation-are illuminated within relatively copious decisional
law1 and learned commentary. 2 Other Chapter Eleven guarantees,
such as that requiring fair and equitable treatment, while far from
novel, are not the subject of plentifully reported adjudication or the
10. Chapter Eleven arbitral tribunals are instructed to decide matters submitted
to them by reference to the NAFTA and "applicable rules of international law."
NAFTA Art. 1131. Article 1105 requires a Party to accord investors of other Parties
and their investments "treatment in accordance with international law" and Article
1110 (Expropriation and Compensation) is no doubt expected to be viewed in light of
international law. The authors believe that NAFTA contemplates resort to, in
addition to the treaty text, both custom and general principles of law recognized in
developed legal systems. As to the latter, see generally BIN CHENG, GENERAL
PRINCIPLES OF LAW AS APPLIED BY INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS (1973).
11. One modem collection of awards has been produced by the Iran-U.S. Claims
Tribunal (Claims Tribunal), constituted at the Hague pursuant to the Algiers
Accords and in particular the Claims Settlement Declaration. See generally JOHN
WESTBERG, INTERNATIONAL TRANSACTIONS AND CLAIMS INVOLVING GOVERNMENT
PARTIES 3-4, 293-96 (1991) (discussing and reprinting the Claims Settlement
Declaration). It has been suggested by the Canadian and Mexican governments that
Claims Tribunal awards should be approached with special care, perhaps bordering
on suspicion, because that tribunal's mandate contemplated that recoveries could be
granted not only for "expropriations" but also for "other measures affecting property
rights." Claims Settlement Declaration, art. II (emphasis added). The risk of a
NAFTA tribunal misunderstanding the basis upon which a Claims Tribunal award
rests seems rather remote. Generally, a Claims Tribunal award makes it clear when
it depends upon the law of expropriation and supplies authority for its findings.
Those aberrant awards that rely on the property interference mandate make little
effort to conceal that rationale. Regardless, because tribunal awards are reasoned,
typically at great length (often with separate opinions and dissents), subsequent
tribunals will be able to assess the individual persuasiveness of the Claims Tribunal
awards they encounter. Accordingly, no wholesale discounting of that jurisprudence
is warranted.
12. See, e.g., Rosalyn Higgins, The Taking of Property by the State, 176 RECUEIL
DES COURS 259, 262 (1982); Rudolf Dolzer, Indirect Expropriation of Alien Property
under International Law, 1 ICSID REV. 41 (1986); George Aldrich, What Constitutes
a Compensable Taking of Property? The Decisions of the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal,
88 AM. J. INT'L L. 585 (1994).
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work of many publicists. 3 In general, counsel's initial assessment of a
prospective claim benefits from sharp jurisprudential demarcations
only to a limited extent. The available travaux preparatoires,
moreover, are highly limited. 4 In such a setting, the express objects
of the NAFTA itself may provide both inspiration and authority.5
Matters of substantive law are in a sense only secondary. In
international arbitration, as with other adjudicative processes, the
governing law in the abstract is less important than its application to
the facts at hand; there is no substitute, therefore, for an assiduous
reconstruction of the investment's history and the events giving rise to
the investor's injuries. In turn, the harms of purely private authorship
must be separated from those attributable to the host state under
13. But see F. A. Mann, British Treaties for the Promotion and Protection of
Investments, 52 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 241, 243-44 (1981); RUDOLF DOLZER &
MARGRETE STEVENS, BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES 58-60 (1995).
14. Some would characterize the travaux as non-existent. The authors use the
term in a broad sense to include, e.g., Message from the President of the United States
Transmitting North American Free Trade Agreement, Text of Agreement,
Implementing Bill, Statement of Administrative Action and Required Supporting
Statements, H.R. Doc. No. 103-159, Vol. 1 (1993) (cited by the United States in its
post-hearing brief). Commentators have nonetheless helped place Chapter Eleven in
context. See Price, supra note 4; E. E. Murphy, Access and Protection for Foreign
Investment in Mexico Under Mexico's New Foreign Investment Law and the North
American Free Trade Agreement, 10 ICSID REV. 54 (1998); G. Sandrino, The
NAFTA Investment Chapter and Foreign Direct Investment in Mexico: A Third World
Perspective, 27 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 259 (1994).
15. Consider, for example, the question whether the NAFTA's obligations
extend to the acts and omissions of local authorities. NAFTA Article 105 requires
the Parties to take "all necessary measures" to ensure NAFTA observance "by state
and provincial governments." A literal interpretation of that Article would suggest
that local authorities, because they are not expressly mentioned, are excluded from
NAFTA discipline. Other NAFTA provisions, however, surgically exclude from
NAFTA coverage local government action expressly, suggesting that a general
exemption for such action was not intended. See, e.g., NAFTA, Art. 1108(1)(a)(iii).
Assuming reasonable doubt remains in light of Article 1108, the question should be
resolved in favor of broader coverage, for to exempt municipalities from the
international standard imposed by NAFTA would discourage investment rather than
"increase substantially investment opportunities in the territories of the Parties," one
of the aims set forth in NAFTA Article 102. Moreover, Article 201(2) states that
"unless otherwise specified, a reference to a state or province includes local
governments of that state or province." The authors believe that the same light may
be cast upon the numerous questions of first impression raised by Metalclad. Does,
for example, the obligation to provided fair and equitable treatment (Article 1105)
carry both procedural and substantive protections? Does "fairness," as incorporated
into that Article, require that a host state's regulatory framework posses a minimal
level of transparency? Based upon the NAFTA's aims alone, an affirmative answer
to both questions is warranted, although no provision within the NAFTA directly so
states.
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international law,16 and the latter must be evaluated both individually
and as to their cumulative effects.17
Counsel's understanding of the case typically evolves throughout
the pre-claim period. As counsel's sifting of the international sources
and the pre-claim investigation proceed, refinements in fact and legal
support inevitably emerge. Consequently, a rather fluid approach
may characterize the initial, pre-notice formulation of the case.
Despite the inevitability that theories of recovery and defense will
evolve, perhaps well into the hearing and beyond, 8 there is much
reason to redouble one's pre-notice19 efforts and little reason to defer
such endeavor.? Indeed, by adopting an ample claim extinction
period' and imposing a six-month delay requirement,' the NAFTA
16. An authoritative text containing many rudiments of attribution is the ILC
Draft Articles on State Responsibility, 37 I.L.M. 442 (1993).
17. That breach of a host state's obligations to an investor can be established by
reference to the totality of the acts and omissions of the host state has been accepted
by learned tribunals. See, e.g., Biloune v. Ghana Inv. Ctr & Gov't. of Ghana, 95
I.L.R. 183, 209-10 (1993) (expropriation found); Amco v. Indonesia (Resubmitted
Case), 1 ICSID REP. 560, 621-22 (administrative denial of justice found).
18. Tribunals sometimes request post-hearing briefs and ask the parties to
address therein aspects of the case that remain not fully developed. It is also
common for the arbitrators to give counsel assignments during the hearings, such as
addressing certain questions in the abstract or as applied to the concrete case at hand.
Naturally, such interrogatories may stimulate refinements in each party's theory of
the case.
19. Article 1119 of the NAFTA requires a claimant to notify the Party alleged to
have breached the NAFTA of its intention to file a claim under Chapter Eleven.
That Article specifies the content of the notice that must be delivered to the Party in
question at least ninety days before the claim is filed.
20. Ostensible benefits from dedicating resources early in the process include
improved bases to pursue settlement and evaluate offers of settlement, enhanced first
impressions before the tribunal, and better informed and hence more reasonable
disputant expectations.
21. NAFTA Article 1116(2) prohibits an investor from making a claim "if more
than three years have elapsed from the date that the investor first acquired, or should
have first acquired, knowledge of the alleged breach and knowledge that the investor
has incurred loss or damage." Article 1117(2) places the same limitations on an
investor who claims on behalf of an enterprise. Cases of alleged indirect
expropriation, such as Metalclad, may give rise to an unusual defense by a host state,
based on the three-year limitation. Indirect takings often come to f-uition
incrementally; in mounting the defense that a claim is extinct, the host state would be
encouraged to argue, uncharacteristically, for the earliest point for calculating the
three years, requiring it to establish why taking was complete at that point. Where a
number of state acts have occurred that compromise the investment, claimant's
counsel must be mindful of the three-year provision. The period, apparently, is not
tolled merely by notifying of an intent to file a claim or by ensuing negotiations, but
only by filing the claim.
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promotes well-considered claims.
MIT. The Claimant's Non-Arbitral Alternatives
A. Preserving Options
Preferably, the lawyer will become involved with his client's case
no later than when the client learns that it has been injured by an
apparent breach of Chapter Eleven. At that point, careful
coordination should begin between the investor's lead counsel and
any host-state counsel; the goals of this collaboration are to facilitate
essential fact-finding, to prepare for such negotiations with
government officials as may occur, and to avoid precipitous resort to
local remedies that may foreclose or negatively influence other
avenues.
23
B. Negotiation and Consultation
En route to completing due diligence and launching an
investment covered by Chapter Eleven, an investor will have had
interaction with a number of government officials, or quasi-officials
(in the case of state monopolies), whose cooperation and
encouragement may have been a critical ingredient in the decision to
pursue the enterprise. Accordingly, when an apparent breach of the
NAFTA arises, that text's instruction to resort to amicable means24
may coincide well with both an investor's natural inclinations and, in
certain settings, its other business interests.5
Its potential for rapid, confidential and cost-effective resolution
of the grievance also argues for negotiation, given the resource-
22. NAFTA Article 1120 requires that a claim not be filed until "six months have
elapsed since the events giving rise to a claim."
23. See infra note 49 and accompanying text.
24. Article 1118 states, "The disputing parties should first attempt to settle a
claim through consultation or negotiation." Whether this language imposes an
obligation on the parties or is merely precatory is debatable. Practitioners favoring
caution will include in their notice a recitation of the claimant's efforts at consultation
or negotiation.
25. To resort first to non-adjudicative, less-adversarial techniques of dispute
resolution may be particularly advisable if the prospective claimant has other, still
viable, projects within the host state. But strategic considerations also invite prudent
attention. In the absence of an agreement between the parties, none of the
arbitration rules designated by Article 1120 provides for the subsequent evidentiary
exclusion at the arbitral hearing of settlement offers or other communications made
in furtherance of negotiation.
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intensiveness of the adjudicative alternatives facing the disputants.
C. U.S. Court Litigation
Parties aggrieved in connection with an international transaction,
and their counsel, often indulge a homing instinct, causing them to
think first of litigation in familiar fora. For U.S. investors, that
propensity is understandable. After all, litigation in U.S. courts
offers-at least in theory-settled procedures (including wide-ranging
discovery), neutral judges, geographic and linguistic suitability, access
to a civil jury, reduced dependence on foreign local counsel, and
myriad other ostensible advantages.
In relation to NAFTA-based grievances, however, the American
domestic court option has been largely foreclosed by the NAFTA's
U.S. implementing legislation. The relevant provision is broadly
worded, providing in pertinent part that "[n]o person other than the
United States... shall have any cause of action or defense under [the
NAFTA]."2
Even if private actions were not precluded by statute, an
American plaintiff would face the other obstacles associated with
actions against sovereign states, including those potentially posed by
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act 7 and the Act of State
Doctrine.' As the aim would be to rely upon the NAFTA, or
26. 19 U.S.C. § 3312(c).
27. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602-11 (1976). The
Act implements the "restrictive" theory of the underlying doctrine by subjecting the
general rule of immunity for states and certain state entities to various exceptions. A
careful reading of the Act reveals that its exceptions to immunity are intricately and
narrowly crafted. For example, immunity is lifted to enforce "rights in property
taken in violation of international law," but only where the property in question (or
property derived therefrom) is present in the United States in connection with
commercial activity or is "owned or operated by an agency or instrumentality...
engaged in a commercial activity in the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (a)(3).
28. As a matter of judicial self-restraint promoted by separation of powers
concerns, American courts are reluctant to adjudicate claims that require for their
resolution an assessment of the validity of acts done by a sovereign concerning
property within that sovereign's own territory. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 433; see generally GARY BORN,
INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES COURTS (1996). Beyond this
general statement of the Act of State Doctrine one encounters some uncertainty; the
putative exceptions remain poorly defined and the U.S. Supreme Court, although
narrowing the doctrine's application, has not fully unified the approach. See W.S.
Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Environmental Tectonics Corp., 493 U.S. 400 (1990) (Act of
State Doctrine not applicable unless adjudication would assess validity of sovereign
measure; potential embarrassment to foreign state does not implicate the Doctrine).
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perhaps the law of nations alone, further questions related to standing
and subject matter jurisdiction might also arise.29
Nevertheless, the core of the Doctrine is sufficiently well established to impede
routine cases where an American investor complains of host country measures
affecting the enjoyment of property within the host state's territory. See Banco
National De Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964). Although, the Sabbatino
Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act, 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) (sometimes called
the "Second Hickenlooper Amendment") would appear to exempt from the
Doctrine uncompensated takings of property by foreign host states, the Amendment
has generally met with narrow constructions in U.S. courts. See, e.g., Empresa
Cubana Exportadora De Azucar y Sus Derivados v. Lamborn & Co. Inc., 652 F.2d
231 (2d Cir. 1981) (Amendment intended to apply only if expropriated property
found within the United States); but see Ramirez de Arello v. Weinberger, 745 F.2d
1500, 1541-42 n.180 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Amendment not limited to property found
within the United States), vacated on other grounds, 471 U.S. 1113 (1985). Were
private claimants able to bring NAFTA claims in American Courts, perhaps the
"treaty exception" would hold the most promise for evading the Doctrine. Indeed, it
has been held that expropriation provisions not unlike those of the NAFTA satisfy
the exception. See Kalamazoo Spice Extraction Co. v. Provisional Military Gov't. of
Socialist Ethiopia, 729 F.2d 422 (6th Cir. 1984) (Doctrine inapplicable when
governing treaty supplies clear rules for adjudicating claim).
29. For helpful background reading, see JOHN ROGERS, INTERNATIONAL LAW
AND UNITED STATES LAW 74-92; 220-31 (1999). The much discussed notion that a
private litigant can assert breaches of international law in U.S. courts flows, prima
facie, from the U.S. Constitution's extension of federal judicial power to "all Cases, in
Law and Equity, arising under the Constitution, the Law of the United States, and
Treaties made, or that shall be made, under their Authority." U.S. CONST. art. III, §
2, cl. 1. For an illustrative list of academic contributions bearing upon the question,
see Curtis Bradley & Jack Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal
Common Law: A Critique of the Modem Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 816, 837 n.151
(1997); William S. Dodge, The Historical Origins of the Alien Tort Statute: A
Response to the "Originalists," 19 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 221 n.2 (1996).
A litigant's successful invocation of a treaty not implemented by statute would, as a
matter of first principles, depend upon whether the treaty was "self-executing" (a
quality delineated by U.S. domestic case law). See, e.g., Asakura v. Seattle, 265 U.S.
332, 340 (1924) (Japan-U.S. FCN treaty should be given effect by the courts; city
licensing ordinance discriminating against aliens subject to FCN's provision ensuring
"trade [in the United States] . . . upon the same terms as native citizens"). For
Professor Rogers the essential question is whether as a matter of international law
"the treaty was intended ... to stipulate the immediate creation of rights cognizable
in domestic courts." ROGERS, supra, at 77 (adopting the formulation of Professor
Stefan Riesenfeld, The Doctrine of Self-Executing Treaties and U.S. v. Postak Win at
Any Price?, 74 AM. J. INT'L L. 892, 896-97, 900-01 (1980)).
Because the NAFTA has been implemented by statute, as a matter of pure logic,
self-execution analysis would seem to be irrelevant; presumably, the controlling
construction would be of the implementing statute. But see Made in the USA
Foundation v. U.S., 56 F. Supp. 2d 1226, 1236-41 (N.D. Ala. 1999) (whether NAFTA
is self-executing discussed in relation to standing to attack NAFTA's
constitutionality).
Since the NAFTA requires a host state to accord investors treatment no less
favorable than that established in international law, to the extent that violations of
[Vol. 23.311
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IV. Arbitration Options
A. In General
Arbitration has become a fixture in international trade and
investment because it compares favorably to the alternatives.' It
provides a neutral mechanism3' characterized by private
proceedings,32 flexible procedures, expert decision-makers,' relative
customary international law are actionable in U.S. courts, a litigant could in
substance assert NAFTA breaches without depending upon it directly. Such an
action would not fall cleanly under the Implementing Act's prohibition.
Nevertheless, the extent to which the "law of nations" can be the basis of a private
action in U.S. courts is the subject of vigorous academic and judicial debate,
inevitably parsing Justice Gray's often-quoted pronouncement in Paquete Habana
that "[i]nternational law is part of our law." The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700
(1900). Proponents suggest that if federal common law includes the "law of nations,"
it follows that Article III's "arising under" clause extends to claims alleging, e.g.,
takings unaccompanied by compensation commensurate with the international
standard. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES §§ 111, 115; but see Bradley & Goldsmith, supra, at 833-34
(discussing critically the assimilation of customary international law into federal
common law).
In principle, the Implementing Act's prohibition of private NAFTA based claims
would not also preclude actions asserting rights under private law, such as those
arising out of a contract or concession with a NAFTA Party and governed solely by
municipal law, though admittedly confusion might arise given that the NAFTA
expressly includes concessions within the definition of "investment." See NAFrA
Art. 1139. American courts are in theory equipped to apply foreign law; a Mexican
law clause contained in a concession agreement would not affect the court's
jurisdiction, except as one factor in a forum non conveniens analysis. More
problematic for the investor seeking access to an American court are the Mexican
forum clauses also common to such arrangements. Forum selection clauses are
honoted by U.S. courts in most cases, leading to dismissal of the action in favor of the
parties' agreed forum. See Bremen v. Zapata, 407 U.S. 1 (1972).
30. See JACK COE, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION-AMERICAN
PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT 19-22, 27, 48-49 (1997)
[hereinafter PRINCIPLES AND PRACrICE]; ALAN REDFERN & MARTIN HUNTER,
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBrrRATION 22-39 (2d ed. 1991).
31. Neutrality has several facets. Geographically, the oral proceedings need not
occur in a place more convenient to one side than the other. Procedurally, rule
formulae typically incorporate elements of the civil law and the common law and
may, by agreement, be refined by the parties. Tribunal neutrality is also a basic tenet
of international arbitration. Under the international standard, tribunal members
must be both impartial and independent of the parties. See REDFERN & HUNTER,
supra note 30, at 218-26.
32. Hearings ordinarily are not open to the public. See, e.g., UNCITRAL
Arbitration Rules, art. 25(4) ("Hearings shall be held in camera unless the parties
agree otherwise.").
33. Each party appoints one arbitrator; under the NAFrA, the disputing parties
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finality,' and enforceability of the result.35 For a host state, private
adjudication before a learned tribunal within a relaxed procedural
framework will often be preferable to defending against litigation in
an investor's home state.
B. Choice of Rules
An aggrieved investor has a choice of arbitral regimes:
proceedings under the UNCITRAL Rules or arbitration under
whichever of the ICSID regimes obtains. The latter depends upon
whether the host state and the investor's home state are parties to the
ICSID Convention.3 6 ICSID arbitration, whether Convention-based
jointly appoint the third arbitrator if they can agree on that person. Thus, at least as
to two of the three arbitrators, each party can promote by careful selections a
measure of technical and legal expertise on the tribunal, an influence often not given
them in domestic court proceedings.
34. In general, there is only limited recourse from an arbitral award, the
exception being awards issued under the ICSID Convention. See infra note 104 and
accompanying text. Typically, awards may be resisted or set aside only for gross
procedural irregularities and deficient arbitral jurisdiction, rather than substantive
matters implicating a merits review.
35. The New York Convention's wide acceptance (approximately 125 states) and
the narrow construction typically given to its "refusal" grounds allow one to make
this generalization. See Gerald Aksen & Wendy Dorman, Application of the New
York Convention by United States Courts: A Twenty-Year Review (1970-1990), 2 AM.
REv. INT'L ARB. 65, 81-86 (1991); Pieter Sanders, A Twenty Year's Review of the
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 13 INT'L
LAW. 269 (1979); Albert Jan van den Berg, Refusals of Enforcement under the New
York Convention of 1958: The Unfortunate Few, in ICC, ARBITRATION IN THE NEXT
DECADE 75 (1999). A relatively current list of New York Convention parties is
published regularly by the Institute for Transnational Arbitration (ITA) in its
newsletter. See 13(1) NEWS AND NOTES FROM THE INsTrruTE FOR TRANSNATIONAL
ARBIrRATION 3-6 (1999) (Table current as of Dec. 1, 1998) [hereinafter ITA
Scoreboard].
36. The United States has ratified the ICSID Convention. At present, however,
neither Canada nor Mexico is a party to that treaty, which establishes a relatively
comprehensive arbitral regime designed to be largely independent of national legal
systems. Because of the existing pattern of treaty participation, a claim brought by
an American investor against either Canada or Mexico could not be arbitrated under
the Convention. The remaining choices are arbitrations administered under ICSID's
Additional Facility or arbitration under the UNCITRAL Rules. In addition to its
relative comprehensiveness, the ICSID Convention is distinguishable from both the
New York and Panama Conventions in its provisions on post award proceedings
potentially affecting the award's finality. See infra note 104 and accompanying text.
Arbitrations under the ICSID Convention are governed by the ICSID Arbitration
Rules (as distinct from ICSID's Additional Facility text). They are reprinted in
ICSID BASIC DOCUMENTS 61-89 (1985) (Doc. No. ICSID/15) and in PRINCIPLES AND
PRACTICE, supra note 30, at 677-98, and are textually similar, but not identical to, the
Additional Facility formulation.
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or under the Additional Facility, is "administered" as opposed to "ad
hoc." In exchange for fees, the institution performs a number of
functions and provides a number of services that would otherwise be
left to the tribunal or to the parties. It provides a central registry and
clearing house for communications to the tribunal and to the other
disputants. ICSID, for instance, can provide hearing rooms,
interpretation, and transcription. The practice of designating a law-
trained staff member to act as tribunal secretary, also a feature of
ICSID administration,' enables a division of labor that is helpful to
the tribunal and to the parties.
It is not clear that by offering an investor UNCITRAL
arbitration, NAFTA's drafters necessarily envisioned non-
administered arbitration; but that formulation is designed to operate
without an institution? and no mention is made of institutional
assistance.' 9  Regardless, the allure of ad hoc (non-administered)
arbitration is not irresistible. Ad hoc arbitration places a premium on
having administratively adept tribunal presidents and tends to require
greater attention to clerical detail on the parts of counsel.'4 Perceived
cost savings associated with ad hoc arbitration may be illusory,
moreover, because, institutional experience and an institution's
service-provider affiliations often cannot readily be matched by
private parties.4'
37. See Antonio Parra, The Role of the ICSID Secretariat in the Administration of
Arbitration Proceedings Under the ICSID Convention, 13 ICSID REv. 85, 89-90
(1998).
38. Nevertheless, nothing in that formulation, or apparently in the NAFTA itself,
precludes a proceeding assisted by the Commercial Arbitration and Mediation
Center for the Americas (CAMCA) or a similar institution. Indeed, many arbitral
institutions have expressed a willingness to administer arbitrations governed by the
UNCITRAL Rules and it could be argued that this possibility must have been within
the contemplation of the NAFTA' s drafters.
39. Presumably, foremost among the perceived advantages of choosing
UNCITRAL arbitration are potentially reduced costs, although claimants might also
be attracted by that text's familiarity and success in practice. For over two decades,
with certain modifications, the UNCITRAL Rules supplied the procedural regime at
the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal; they have accordingly been tested and discussed far
more vigorously than the Additional Facility Rules. See generally DAVID CARON &
MATrI PELLONPAA, THE UNCITRAL ARBITRATION RULES AS INTERPRETED AND
APPLIED (1995); STEWART BAKER & MARK DAvIs, THE UNCITRAL ARBITRATION
RULES IN PRActiCE (1992).
40. Nothing, of course, prevents the appointment of a tribunal secretary, with the
parties' permission. Skillful assistance of this type can enhance the practicability of
ad hoc proceedings.
41. Located in The World Bank headquarters in Washington, D.C., ICSID
provides parties free use of its commodious facilities, both for the oral hearing and
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V. Timing Considerations and Prerequisites
A. In General
An investor's claim under NAFTA Chapter Eleven may not be
brought until six months have elapsed since "the events giving rise to
the claim."'42 At least 90 days before the claim is submitted, the
investor must give notice to the respondent state of its intention to
file its claim.' The latter must contain specified information
including the NAFTA provisions alleged to have been breached, the
relief sought, and an approximation of damages.' Taken together,
these articles establish a period presumably intended to facilitate
reflection and resort to collaborative means of settlement.
B. Jurisdictional Significance of the Notice of Intent
Among the questions that have arisen in connection with the
timing and notice requirements is the extent to which post-notice
events can be relied upon by a claimant, either to bolster existing
allegations of sub-NAFTA treatment or to found entirely new
theories of breach. For example, if after the notice of arbitration is
filed, the host state passes a law that, independent of other state
measures, appears to substantially curtail the operation of the
claimant's investment, may its expropriative effects be submitted to
the tribunal as part of the claimant's case?
It might be argued that because the claimant will have set forth
in its notice both the NAFTA provisions said to have been breached
and the "factual basis for the claim," it ought to be restricted from
later introducing theories and facts not delineated in the original
notice. Facially, the positive attribute of such a limitation is that it
would encourage investors to ensure that their claims are fully ripe;
where further governmental acts could be foreseen, claimants would
be encouraged to delay their notice so as to formulate it as completely
for tribunal deliberations. A further consideration for the cost-conscious claimant is
the Additional Facility Administrative and Financial Rules Article 6 cap on the daily
rate paid to the tribunal members and published rates on travel (less than first class)
and per diem. The published daily rate for arbitrators is presently U.S. $1,100. In
practice, the rate is "otherwise agreed by the parties" to be something higher, but, in
the authors' experience, the higher de facto rate is less per hour than a comparable
NAFIA UNCITRAL arbitrators' rate, which is set by the arbitrators themselves.
42. NAFTA Art. 1120.
43. Id. Art. 1119.
44. Id.
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as practicable. The predictability created by such a rule is admittedly
attractive. Nevertheless, based upon countervailing policy concerns
and the text itself, the present authors remain unconvinced that this
view should be sustained, for it leaves host states too free to punish
investors for bringing claims and promotes inefficiencies in the
adjudicative process; further, it does not allow for the development of
the case over time."u
C. Exhaustion of Local Remedies
A general precept accepted in international law, the local
remedies rule, holds that actions against a state on behalf of a private
party are not ripe until that party has sufficiently exhausted avenues
of redress available to it in the respondent state's domestic legal
system. Although capable of being eliminated by treaty, the rule
retains vitality, especially in the context of an espoused claim. It has
also been expressly preserved in some, but not all, modern investment
45. The investment affected by the measures complained of may be only one of
several within the host state or may be part of a broader integrated project. If after
the notice is served, other aspects of the operation are subjected to unfair treatment,
should the investor not be able to amend its complaint accordingly? Freezing the
facts of the case as of the time the notice is served would leave the investor only the
option of filing a separate, fresh claim under Chapter Eleven, thus producing at times
the artificial exclusion of matters otherwise efficiently dealt with as part of the same
case. It would also encourage duplicative, serial proceedings, a result that seems
greatly at odds with one of NAFTA's express aims: to provide "effective procedures
for the resolution of disputes." Id. Art. 102.
That the filing of the notice should confine the tribunal's jurisdiction ratione
temporis makes particularly little sense where the impact complained of relates to the
same investment that was the subject of the notice. The apparent function of the
notice is to alert the host state to the investor's grievance so that it may be examined,
and perhaps satisfactorily addressed so as to obviate arbitration. Counsel is expected
to compose the notice without formal discovery and conceivably without having had
the benefit of meaningful discussions with the host state. It is a notice, not a
comprehensive pleading. Concurrently, the rule formulae designated by Article 1120
give the tribunal sufficient power to prevent prejudicial claim amendments and the
belated introduction of theories of recovery.
46. In the ELSI case, a distinguished Chamber of the International Court of
Justice declined to readily infer non-applicability of the rule:
The Chamber has no doubt that the parties to a treaty can therein agree that
the local remedies rule shall not apply to claims based on alleged breaches of
the treaty; or confirm that it shall apply. Yet the Chamber finds itself unable
to accept that an important principle of customary international law should
be held to have been tacitly dispensed with, in the absence of words making
clear an intention to do so.
Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. (ELSI), (U.S. v. Italy), Judgment, 1989 I.C.J. Rep. 15, 42,
para. 50.
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treaties.47
The NAIFTA neither expressly extinguishes nor enforces the
local remedies rule. By clear implication, however, the text casts
substantial doubt upon the rule's relevance to Chapter Eleven
arbitration. Article 1121 requires the investor, as a condition to
arbitration, to waive in writing its right to continue any domestic
proceeding-in the host state or elsewhere-based upon an alleged
breach of the NAFTA. Thus, rather than positing a rule of
exhaustion, the NAFTA merely forecloses certain forms of parallel
domestic actionse and assumes that, if initiated, they may nonetheless
be cut short in order to pursue arbitration.
D. The Impact of Domestic Proceedings
Other questions raised by the possibility of domestic proceedings
are more challenging. One such question, which will not be fully
addressed here, relates to the effect to be given by a NAFTA tribunal
to domestic court adjudications. Even in situations where the
domestic tribunal did not purport to apply the NAFTA, findings of
fact or pronouncements of domestic law will often be relevant. But to
what extent should they be given conclusive effect by the tribunal?
And what if the domestic court or tribunal purports to apply the
NAFTA, and concludes, for example, that no breach has occurred?49
47. See Antonio Parra, Provisions on the Settlement of Investment Disputes in
Modem Investment Laws, Bilateral Investment Treaties and Multilateral Instruments
on Investment, 12 ICSID REV. 287,333 (1997).
48. The prohibition on parallel proceedings applies to non-NAFTA arbitration
but does not disallow actions for injunctive or declaratory relief in domestic courts.
See NAFTA Art. 1121(2)(b). NAFTA's waiver provision was the subject of an
award and dissenting opinion in Waste Management v. United Mexican States, Case
No. ARB(AF)/98/2, reprinted in 15 ICSID REv. FOR. INV. L.J. 214 (2000). See
William S. Dodge, Waste Management, Inc. v. Mexico, __ AM. J. INT'L. L. __ (2000)
(case note and commentary).
49. Annex 1120.1 adds an important qualification in relation to claims against
Mexico. It states in pertinent part:
With respect to a submission of a claim to arbitration ... an investor of
another Party may not allege that Mexico has breached an obligation under
[the Investment Chapter's § A] both in an arbitration under this Section and
in proceedings before a Mexican court or administrative tribunal ....
Because it attaches elective consequences to allegations before domestic Mexican
fora, the Annex does more than prohibit certain types of parallel proceedings, a
restriction already accomplished by Article 1121(2)(b) (requiring waiver of right to
initiate or continue proceedings under the law of any Party). An analogous, similarly
worded, clause in the Annex is directed to actions brought by Mexican enterprises
owned by an investor of another Party. Strictly construed, neither clause requires
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The authors' view is that the domestic court proceedings ought
not to enjoy in NAFTA arbitration the kinds of preclusive effects that
an American-trained lawyer associates with res judicata and collateral
estoppel. Such dispositions merely are facts, albeit potentially
compelling facts. The tribunal may accord to such rulings such weight
as seems appropriate given a range of factors, including but not
limited to, the context in which the domestic proceedings were
brought, the thoroughness with which the arguments were mutually
pursued, the level and competence of the body pronouncing itself, the
force of any reasoning that accompanied the decision, and the
competence and presumed expertise of the adjudicators in relation to
the subject matter in question."0
VI. Composing the Tribunal
A. In General
The adage that the arbitral process is only as good as the
arbitrators forming the tribunal holds true in relation to NAFrA
investment arbitration. Consistent with established practice in
international arbitration, the appointment rules established under the
NAFTA give the disputing parties a role in the appointment process.51
that to render arbitration unavailable the domestic proceedings in question must
have been concluded; thus, a NAFTA-based action initiated but thereafter
abandoned would appear to bar resort to NAIFTA arbitration, although the
boundaries of this trap for the unwary have not been tested. Related questions also
arise: does the Annex apply to actions that are declaratory or injunctive in nature-
that is, to proceedings potentially collateral to arbitration that are otherwise available
to an investor despite the waiver requirement of Article 1121? Could Mexico
successfully argue that a claimant's invocation of the NAFTA in an amparo action is
within Mexico's Annex 1120.1 reservation, so that subsequent arbitration would be
foreclosed, even though Article 1121 does not require that the investor waive efforts
to obtain such relief? And what if the NAFTA was raised proprio motu in such a
proceeding? Such issues should fall to the tribunal to decide as an aspect of its
competency to determine its own competency. The Annex's corollary effect should
also be noted: having alleged NAFTA breaches before a Chapter Eleven tribunal, a
claimant seemingly would be precluded from bringing an action in a Mexican court
based upon the same alleged breach.
50. Thus, an appellate domestic court's confirmation of an inferior court's
application of domestic law should appreciably influence a tribunal as to the content
of domestic law on the point in question, assuming there was no conflicting authority
of equal weight within that domestic system. By contrast, a municipal court's
exposition of international law-a subject concerning which the tribunal will often
have considerable expertise-would be less influential.
51. NAFTA Art. 1123.
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In the normal two-party context, each of the disputing parties
appoints an arbitrator. The third arbitrator, who is to preside, is
appointed jointly by the two parties.52
B. The Party-Appointed Arbitrators
Experienced practitioners employ diverse approaches in
identifying prospective appointees. Some develop short lists and
compare and contrast among the prospective, available appointees.
Some quickly arrive at one name, and approach others only if that
person is unavailable. Most candidates enjoy established reputations,
although there is little substitute for word-of-mouth
recommendations to corroborate a party's sense of the candidate's
suitability. In general, the process allows a claimant sufficient time to
choose its appointee wisely.53
Ordinarily, a number of qualities are desirable in a party-
appointed arbitrator. Their other obligations should leave them free
to dedicate the sometimes considerable time and energy necessary to
master the details of the case and they should possess sufficient
patience and vigor to participate fully in the process until an award is
signed, however protracted the proceedings may become. Knowledge
of the rudiments of international law would seem nearly
indispensable, although in the authors' view, expertise in the
commercial field in which the dispute has arisen would not be
critical.'
It is preferable that the appointee have a working knowledge of
the languages in which documentary and oral evidence will likely
originate. The availability of high quality interpretation and the
obligation of the parties to provide translations of documents
52. See id. The more prevalent approach contemplates that the two party-
appointed arbitrators will appoint the presiding arbitrator, although it is customary
for the two to seek the views of the appointing parties during the process. See
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules art. 7.1; see also PRINCIPLES AND PRACrICE, supra
note 30, at 463-816 (reprinting various international arbitration rules and statutes
largely adopting this standard format when three-person tribunals are to serve).
53. See generally Gavin Griffith, Constitution of Arbitral Tribunals: The Duty of
Impartiality in Tribunals or Choose Your Arbitrator Wisely, 13 ICSID REV. 36 (1998);
Andreas Lowenfeld, The Party-Appointed Arbitrator in International Controversies:
Some Reflections, 30 TEXAS INT'L L.J. 59 (1995).
54. Experience with general commercial law and industries analogous to that in
question typically equip a candidate sufficiently well, provided he or she is able to
become immersed in the case and stands ready to consider the views of experts
employed by the parties.
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mitigates the deficiencies an arbitrator might have in this respect.
The authors would not rule out an otherwise attractive candidate on
this basis alone.
Ideally, the appointee's temperament, reputation, and
knowledge of the process will be such that he or she will work well
and carry influence with the other arbitrators, particularly the
presiding arbitrator. That is not to suggest that the party-appointed
arbitrator should be someone predisposed to favoring the appointing
party-a view sometimes advanced by practitioners accustomed to
certain forms of domestic arbitration. Under the NAFrA, party-
appointed arbitrators are not agents or advocates of the parties;
instead, they are to be independent, in keeping with the international
standard. An arbitrator who departs from that expectation risks
being removed from office or, at a minimum, losing credibility with
the presiding arbitrator.
In counseling a party, it is therefore more accurate and
strategically more useful to posit that a party-appointed arbitrator
should be someone capable of being sympathetic to the appointing
party's case who is also equipped to aid the presiding arbitrator in
understanding the commercial and jurisprudential elements essential
to that case."
C. The Presiding Arbitrator
The presiding arbitrator will ordinarily have case-management
and other duties that exceed those of the other arbitrators, such as
enunciating procedural rulings throughout the arbitration and
drafting the ultimate award.56 Matters of decorum, efficiency, and
procedural fairness are often greatly influenced by the presiding
arbitrator's attitudes and instructions. That person should, therefore,
have particular familiarity with the process and adroitness in blending
the differing expectations that may arise from diverse legal cultures.
It is also commonplace and desirable in arbitrations involving a
55. Care should be taken to document any contacts with the prospective
arbitrator that preceded appointment; good practice dictates that such contacts, if
they are to occur at all, should be narrowly circumscribed and should involve no
discussion about the facts or merits of the case. Under Article 14 of the Additional
Facility Rules, any past and present relationships to a party must be disclosed by the
appointee no later than at the first session of the tribunal. Additionally, Article 9
requires an arbitrator to "exercise independent judgment."
56. See REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 30, at 246; PRINciPLEs AND PRACTICE,
supra note 30, at 230,252-55.
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state that the president have considerable background in
international law. In combination with a capacity for clear writing,
this attribute promotes authoritative awards likely to be helpful to the
parties and non-parties alike.
VII. The Deemed Place of Arbitration:
An Important Juridical Anchor
A. In General
Modern international arbitration theory holds that each
proceeding has a juridical "seat" often also referred to as the "place"
or "situs" of arbitration.57 The NAFTA provides that Chapter Eleven
arbitration is to be held in the territory of a NAFTA Party. Although
not required by the language of the NAFTA, a locale in the third
NAFTA state will often be designated in an effort by the tribunal to
convey neutrality or as the basis of a compromise between the parties.
Under NAFTA Article 1130, ordinarily the situs will also be in a New
York Convention state.58
The choice of situs is not merely a geographic designation
influenced by the convenience of the tribunal and the parties. Under
the prevailing view, the situs supplies the lex arbitri, i.e., that body of
arbitration law that governs a range of important questions. 9
Moreover, an award will ordinarily be deemed to have been rendered
at the situs regardless of where the hearings occurred or where the
award was signed;' the courts of the situs, in turn, rule upon requests
to vacate awards deemed rendered at the situs.
61
57. See REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 30, at 77-91; PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE,
supra note 30, at 52-55, 170-71.
58. At present, that qualification describes all NAFTA states. The requirement
anticipates the potential for new NAFTA parties that might not be New York
Convention members. The restriction, which is subject to contrary agreement by the
disputing parties, is designed to facilitate enforcement of the award; the award for
New York Convention purposes generally carries the national affiliation of the situs
designated for the arbitration, in principle, irrespective of where the proceedings
actually took place. See Redfem & Hunter, supra note 30, at 302-04; RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 487, cmt. b.
59. See W. LAURENCE CRAIG. ET AL., INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE
ARBITRATION 447-49 (2d ed. 1990) (listing issues governed by the lex arbitri).
60. The UNCITRAL Model Law reflects this role for the designated situs. See
UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, arts. 6, 20, 34,
G.A. Res. 85, No. 40/72 (adopted Dec. 1, 1985), reprinted in PRINCIPLES AND
PRACTICE, supra note 30, at 505 (hereinafter Model Law).
61. See generally KLAUS BERGER, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ARBITRATION
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B. Practical Consequences-The Metaiclad Example
The jurisdictional implications and applicable law associated with
traditional-seat theory were apparent in Metalclad. Vancouver, B.C.
was designated as the situs. Accordingly, the lex arbitri was rooted in
the Model Law as adopted in British Columbia. Although for
practical reasons the proceedings took place in Washington, D.C.,
when procedural issues arose it was British Columbia's Model Law
(as augmented by the NAFTA and the governing rules) to which the
parties referred when formulating procedural views.62 Similarly,
under the prevailing view, it would be to that Law and the courts of
British Columbia that a dissatisfied party would turn if seeking
vacatur of the award.63
VII. Establishing the Initial Procedural Road Map:
Organizational Meetings
A. In General
For numerous reasons, participants in a given international
arbitration may not come to the process with shared procedural
expectations. Modern arbitral practice therefore recognizes the
utility of tribunal-conducted meetings occurring at various points
before the hearing in chief.64 The specific procedural and clerical
matters that such meetings address vary with the stage at which they
occur and the complexity of the dispute.6s In general, they anticipate
the subsequent phases of the proceeding by resolving issues that
might later distract the parties and the tribunal.
647-58 (1993).
62. Mexico, for example, sought to have the claimant's reply entirely stricken on
formal grounds related to the briefs format. The claimant's response called attention
to, inter alia, the Model Law's maxim that the parties are to be treated with equality
and that each is to be given a full opportunity of presenting its case. See MODEL
LAW, Art. 18. Mexico's request was denied.
63. See id., Arts. 6,34.
64. An immensely helpful booklet that provides an annotated checklist of topics
and concerns in anticipating such meetings is UNCITRAL, Notes on Organizing
Arbitral Proceedings, UNCITRAL Y.B., vol. XXVI: 1995, pt. 1, reprinted in
PRINCIPLES AND PRAcrIcE, supra note 30, at 421-39.
65. See generally Howard Holtzmann, Balancing the Need for Certainty and
Flexibility in International Arbitration Procedures, in INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION
IN THE 21sT CENTuRY: TOwARDs JUDICIALIZATION AND UNIFORMITY? 12-13
(Richard Lillich & Charles Brower eds., 1993).
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B. The Initial Meeting
It would not be unusual for the tribunal, soon after its
composition, to gather the parties to hear an outline of their
respective cases on the merits, and to solicit their views on the place
of arbitration, whether the proceedings should be bifurcated,6 the
extent and manner of discovery,67 and numerous clerical matters. As
discussed in the following section, in Metalclad the question of
confidentiality might well have been addressed at the first meeting
convened by the tribunal; it was not, and the parties' differing
expectations soon became manifest.
IX. Confidentiality as an Illustrative Preliminary Issue
A common but unwarranted notion exists that confidentiality
shrouds arbitration in general, and a Chapter Eleven arbitration in
particular. Were that true as a general proposition, there would
certainly be laudable policies to support it. Yet, none of the rule texts
relevant to Chapter Eleven proceedings in fact unambiguously
support that view,' and the precedent and arbitral practice familiar to
the authors seem similarly bereft of any such axiom. Nonetheless,
because Metalclad was the first Additional Facility case, the question
had not been answered in the context of the Additional Facility
Rules. Mexico, through a request for interim measures, placed the
issue squarely before the tribunal.
The facts that touched off the interim controversy were as
follows. One month after a July 1997 procedural meeting convened
by the tribunal in Washington, D.C., Metalclad's CEO discussed in a
66. Bifurcation leads to certain logically antecedent issues being briefed, argued
and decided before others. The technique is often used to isolate for preliminary
treatment questions of jurisdiction or liability. Thus, in the case of liability, the
question of damages would be addressed in a subsequent proceeding, but only if
liability is first established.
67. Wide-ranging discovery as practiced in U.S. federal courts is not the norm in
international arbitration, although if the parties agree, they may submit to an
analogous regime of their own design. See BERGER, supra note 61, at 430-31;
REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 30, at 330-34.
68. The UNCITRAL Rules make no reference to confidentiality, but do state in
Rule 25(4) that oral hearings shall be held in camera unless the parties otherwise
agree. Both the ICSID and Additional Facility Rules, (Rule 15 and Article 24,
respectively), require that the deliberations of the tribunal be in private and remain
secret.
69. Decisions were made on matters such as the filing time for memorial and
counter-memorial, witness declarations, costs, official languages, and requests for and
production of evidence.
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conference call with certain shareholders and brokers some of what
had transpired at that first session. Confidentiality had been
discussed at the procedural meeting briefly and only regarding
deliberations of the tribunal. Long before the case was filed,
telephone conferences of the type involved had become a common
practice for Metalclad.
Once apprized of the CEO's telephone briefing session, Mexico
petitioned the tribunal for an order prohibiting disclosure of any
information regarding the case. Mexico contended that Metalclad
had already seriously breached the confidentiality rule with its CEO's
disclosures. According to Mexico, all matters before the tribunal
were sub judice and confidential.
When heard on the matter, Metalclad contested the existence of
any implied obligation of confidentiality, noted the absence of any
formal agreement on the subject, recounted Mexico's own conduct in
contravention of the supposed rule, and questioned how such an
order might be framed and enforced given existing legal regimes
requiring disclosure of certain information." To a large extent
adopting the views of Metalclad, the tribunal declined to issue the
order that Mexico sought.
71
The president, nevertheless, expressed the view that limiting
public discussion of the case to a minimum would conduce the orderly
70. In particular, Metalclad replied that Mexican officials-federal, state and
local-had widely bruited about their views in the media on facts and theories of the
case; that U.S. securities law obligated Metalclad, as a public company, to publicly
disclose material information; and that no general rule of confidentiality was violated
since none applied. Metalclad observed also that the requirements of the NAFTA,
specifically Articles 1127 and 1129, in combination with the United States' Freedom
of Infohnation Act, ultimately made confidentiality illusory and difficult to enforce.
71. In his written procedural ruling, the president of the tribunal noted the
following considerations: that the order requested by Mexico, and the documentation
accompanying it, to the extent it engaged the tribunal's power to issue provisional
measures of protection, did not meet the threshold requirements that the applicant
party must demonstrate to be successful; that neither the NAFTA nor the ICSID
(Additional Facility) Rules contain any express restriction on the freedom of the
parties to publicly discuss the arbitration proceedings; that no general principle of
confidentiality proscribed public discussion of the arbitration by either party; that no
such limitation is written into major arbitral texts such as the UNCITRAL Rules or
the draft articles on arbitration adopted by the International Law Commissions; and
that Metalclad is obliged by U.S. security laws to provide material information to its
shareholders. The President noted the oft-stated expectation that one of the reasons
for recourse to arbitration is the avoidance of publicity. But he also pointed out that
in the absence of an agreement between the parties, neither is forbidden from public
statements.
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unfolding of the arbitral process and enhance working relations
between the parties.
X. The Written Pleadings
A. In General
Long before the oral hearing, the parties will have exchanged
and submitted to the tribunal written submissions. Under the
Additional Facility Rules, at least one such round occurs: the
claimant's "memorial," followed by the respondent's "counter-
memorial."' If the parties so agree or the tribunal so requires, a
second phase of written submissions precedes the hearing.' In the
nomenclature of the Additional Facility Rules, the second round of
written submissions consists of the claimant's "Reply" and the
respondent's "Rejoinder."'74
B. The Memorial
The memorial is typically the claimant's chief moving document.
In an Additional Facility arbitration, the principal memorial
components are dictated by Article 38 of the Rules, which requires "a
statement of relevant facts; a statement of law; and the submissions."
It is not unusual for the written arbitral pleadings to carry various
documentary proffers in support of the facts alleged (or denied).
These include declarations of persons with personal knowledge of
relevant events, correspondence, internal memoranda, and various
forms of secondary support, such as newspaper articles or reports by
NGOs. Additionally, expert reports on matters such as the content of
applicable law, the extent of damages, and similar matters are often
tendered as part of the written submission in question.
For the attorney formulating the memorial, the exigencies of case
development often create dilemmas. In particular, early indications
sometimes suggest a basis for propounding a theory of recovery, the
success of which will nonetheless require concrete, firsthand support
in place of what may at the time of pleading be plausible but
undocumented information. A declarant, for example, may be
reluctant to put his account in writing, may seek compensation for
72. Additional Facility Rules, art. 38.
73. Id.
74. Id.
[Vol. 23:311
2000] Some Pragmatic Reflections upon the First Case Filed Against Mexico 333
giving a statement, or may encumber the evidence with some other
disability.
Should counsel limit the memorial to only those facts and
theories of recovery that seem most unshakable, believing in the right
to amend the claim as events later warrant? And if counsel does so,
but later seeks substantial amendment to the claim, will that prompt a
suspicion of "sandbagging"? The alternative, however, is to risk the
negative implications that may arise if one or more factual premises
underlying the claimant's theory of the case must be abandoned for
lack of proof.
Such calculated risks are not exclusive to arbitration, but their
evaluation is rendered more complicated by the unpredictable scope
of discovery common to arbitration and the difficulties sometimes
inherent in gathering evidence against a sovereign state within its own
territory. Ultimately, counsel strikes a balance informed by intuition,
the avoidance of extremes, and a healthy skepticism for
uncorroborated sources.
XI. Post-Brief, Pre-Hearing Conferences:
The Marshaling of Evidence and Related Matters
After the pre-hearing written submissions of the parties have
been concluded, a conference designed to configure the hearing in
chief is often held. This provides in particular an opportunity to
accomplish the marshaling of evidence called for in both the
Additional Facility and the traditional ICSID Rules.76 At such a
meeting each party may be expected to specify the witnesses it
intends to cross-examine at the hearing and, depending on the agreed
upon format, anyone whose direct testimony it seeks to elicit; to
outline the matters about which the potential witnesses will be
questioned; and to address unresolved discovery issues.
In addition, a number of structural elements influencing the
format of the hearing are best addressed before the hearing date
arrives; these often have strategic implications and give rise to
75. Id., art. 40.
76. ICSID Arbitration Rules, art. 33.
77. Matters warranting careful thought include the manner of witness
sequestration, the daily and weekly schedule, the order of oral presentations
(opening and closing arguments), whether the parties should anticipate post-hearing
briefs, and the question of how a record of the proceedings will be prepared and
made available to the disputing parties.
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vigorously maintained, differing views. For instance, if more than one
language is being used,78 how will translations during witness
examination be done? That is, will a translator provide simultaneous
interpretation to the witness, or will it be done sequentially?79
XII. The Oral Hearing
A. In General
Modern international arbitration rules acknowledge that, by
agreement, the parties may relinquish the oral hearing, resting instead
on their written submissions.' Viewed solely in light of the costs
involved, documents-only proceedings carry an obvious advantage. 1
Yet, the opportunity to participate in an oral hearing is often chief
among the expectations the parties carry into the arbitral process; by
empowering either party to insist upon a hearing, leading rules texts
acknowledge that reality.'
78. The Additional Facility Rules, in Article 30, provide for two procedural
languages to be used and, unless the tribunal decides otherwise, requires all
instruments filed to be in both languages.
79. The distinction carries practical implications. First, in the event of sequential
(consecutive) translation, the examiner must exercise special care in framing the
questions, breaking them into comestible portions for the translator, and crafting the
structure of the questions for maximum results. Second, sequential translation is
more time-consuming. In Metalclad, the claimant requested that translation be
simultaneous. Although each side had in common a fixed number of days and hours
to present their cases, the additional time necessary for sequential translation would
have disadvantaged the claimant because most of Mexico's witnesses required
examination in Spanish. Mexico countered that only sequential translation would
permit it to monitor the accuracy of translation. Solomon-like, the tribunal
authorized sequential translation, but allotted extra hours to the claimant, if
necessary, that, if taken by the claimant, would also be available pai passu to
Mexico.
80. See RONALD BERNSTEIN ET AL, HANDBOOK OF ARBITRATiON PRACTICE 318-
21, 475-91 (3rd ed. 1998) (discussing practical aspects of "documents-only"
arbitrations).
81. Depending upon the number of witnesses and documents, claimants can
expend considerable resources of time and money in the preparation for and conduct
of an oral hearing. Just the logistics of getting lawyers, staff, clients, witnesses, files,
treatises, pleadings, documents, exhibits, computers and supplies to the place of the
oral hearing can be overwhelming. In Metalclad, the claimant spent over $4 million
getting from notice through post-hearing brief, with approximately $750,000
attributable to the oral hearing.
82. Both ICSID Rules texts establish a default preference favoring inclusion of
an oral hearing. ICSID Rule 29; Additional Facility Rules, art. 36. The latter, for
example, states that unless the parties "otherwise agree, the proceeding shall
comprise two distinct phases: a written procedure followed by an oral one." It
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In the authors' view, an oral hearing is essential to the claimant's
case. The claimant, after all, labors under the burden of proof' and
faces a sovereign opponent with considerable resources. Especially
where witnesses of the Party respondent are also its officials or
employees, the hearing may present the claimant's only opportunity
to test-in the presence of the tribunal-witness competence,
veracity, and bias. And, just as important, a hearing allows the
tribunal to question witnesses directly.
B. Structure and Planning
Under modem arbitral practice, the hearing need not be as
cumbersome as its domestic litigation counterpart. In preparing for
and participating in the hearing, experienced arbitration counsel
harness the flexibility of the arbitral method, devising practices that
take optimal advantage of the limited time allocated to each side.'
Many of these techniques will have been determined at the pre-
hearing conference; some are unilateral' and others are effectuated
by agreement of the parties.'
With sufficient planning, arbitration hearings can move forward
apace; there is no jury and most arbitrators will have substantially
digested the parties' memorials before the hearing. Written witness
statements often replace live direct testimony, so that witnesses
appears, therefore, that either party-without the consent of the other party, or even
despite its objection--can ensure that the tribunal convenes an oral hearing. One
might envision a scenario in which the interpretation of documents constitutes the
full essence of the claim, rendering an oral hearing superfluous. But even then, if an
expert were used, for instance, wisdom might direct one to cross-examine the expert.
83. The burden of proof in international commercial arbitration is not defined
with precision in leading rule formulae. In practice, it typically equates to a "balance
of the probabilities," although certain assertions of fact may in effect attract a
heightened burden because, e.g., they run counter to a factual or legal presumption
adopted by the tribunal. See REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 30, at 249; Charles
Brower, Evidence Before International Tribunals: The Need for Some Standard Rules,
28 INT'LLAW. 47,49 (1994).
84. In the Metalclad case, each party was given an equal, finite amount of time to
present its case. In such instances, counsel must artfully parcel his time among
several tasks: opening, cross-examination, re-direct, and closing argument.
85. As to certain aspects of the case, for example, counsel might announce an
intention to rest on the written submissions or, more dramatically, may abandon a
theory of recovery rendered unsupportable by witness unavailability. Bilingual
counsel may elect to address witnesses in their mother tongue, thus eliminating the
delay of consecutive interpretation.
86. The parties may agree to a common timeline of events or to other factual
stipulations, which the tribunal will then regard as common ground.
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submit only to cross-examination and re-direct,' supplemented by the
tribunal's own questions.' Moreover, tribunals are generally
regarded as having the power-indeed, the responsibility-to actively
advance the proceedings; accordingly, they can be expected to
discourage redundant witnesses, irrelevant cross-examination, and
similarly wasteful methods.'
Oral presentations by counsel generally open and close the
hearing. Despite the lack of a set format for such arguments,' some
common features can be identified. A typical opening might highlight
important common ground and concessions already evident within
the opposition's submissions, outline a set of objectives, reintroduce
broad themes, and restate counsel's theory of the case. Timelines,
elements charts, and similar demonstrative aids are often employed.
Closing arguments typically occupy the final hearing days. They
need not be, but often are, elaborate; much naturally depends upon
tactical considerations9 and the apparent preferences of the tribunal.'
87. See Michael Buhler & Carroll Dorgan, Witness Testimony Pursuant to the
IBA Rules of Evidence in International Commercial Arbitration-Novel or Tested
Standards?, 17 J. INT'L ARB. 3, 12-13, 15 (2000); Paul Friedland, Combining Civil Law
and Common Law Elements in the Presentation of Evidence in International
CommercialArbitration, 12(9) INT'LARB. REP. 25, 28 (1997).
88. Able to study the direct testimony in advance, each party (and, indeed, the
witness to be examined) is afforded greater opportunity for thorough preparation.
89. A countervailing doctrine requires that each party be given a fair opportunity
of presenting its case and tribunals that have made plain that each side has a fixed
number of hours may be reluctant to question how a disputant has chosen to allocate
its time. In general, however, the practitioner must resist any urge to present the
entire case afresh. Members of the panel will have read the pleadings and documents
before the hearing and will be put off by a rehash. What a tribunal expects is for both
parties to cross-examine within the scope of the direct testimony provided in the
witness statements and to question competence and veracity where appropriate.
90. Many aspects of international arbitration are subject to no fixed
nomenclature. The authors tend to refer to the opening remarks as an "argument"
rather than a opening "statement" because in Metalclad, at the time of the oral
hearing, all direct evidence had been submitted, thus providing an occasion to argue
both facts and evidence to the tribunal. And adducing support for the opening
argument in the ensuing cross-examination segues nicely into a strong closing
argument.
91. Counsel must gracefully navigate the boundary between a statement of such
length that it becomes somniferous and getting into the record what the tribunal
members will later read. Whether a post-hearing brief follows may give some
guidance. If yes, then favoring terseness does not compromise the record. If no,
risking the tribunal's ennui for an appropriate record may be the more judicious
course.
92. In Metalclad, the tribunal invited the parties to offer a full treatment of the
governing law and its application to the facts at hand. It also circulated to each party,
[Vol. 23:311
2000] Some Pragmatic Reflections upon the First Case Filed Against Mexico 337
In general, closings integrate a number of elements. Counsel
customarily attempts to show that the objectives initially set out have
been fulfilled by underscoring important testimony, by suggesting
plausible inferences available to the tribunal, and by demonstrating
that the counter-party has failed to prove the facts it has alleged.'
Ordinarily, there is a linking of the established facts to the governing
law; under Chapter Eleven that entails a treatment of the NAFTA's
text as amplified by international law.
A discussion of damages' is customarily also a part of each side's
closing, although in highly complex cases involving intricate valuation
models,95 counsel understandably may prefer to rest largely upon
expert reports already submitted to the tribunal.
C. Party Intervention
Treated here for convenience is a distinctive feature of NAFTA
investment arbitration-the right of a NAFTA Party to make
submissions to the tribunal on a question of interpretation of the
NAFTA.' The provision 7 would seem to rest considerable discretion
in the tribunal to regulate the timing and manner of Party
submissions. In particular, Article 1128 on its face grants no right to
present oral arguments at the hearing (or at any other time), although
during the hearing, a common list of substantive legal questions on which it hoped to
receive guidance. The parties addressed the questions both in closing argument and
in their post-hearing briefs.
93. A related principle found in many formulae is set forth in UNCITRAL Rules,
Article 24.1, which states, "Each party shall have the burden of proving the facts
relied upon to support his claim or defence."
94. NA.FTA Article 1135.3 bars awards of punitive damages. The reference
within that provision to "monetary damages," strictly interpreted, might preclude an
award based on unjust enrichment, a measure of recovery predicated upon a benefit
conferred upon the host state rather than upon injury to the investor.
95. NAFTA Article 1110(2) establishes fair market value as the measure of
recovery in cases of expropriation. It provides an illustrative list of factors bearing on
that determination but dictates no single valuation method. Because the different
valuation approaches can produce radically different recoveries, the appropriate
method and accompanying assumptions are ordinarily vigorously debated. For a
discussion of arbitral tribunal valuation practices, see William Lieblich,
Determinations by International Tribunals of the Economic Value of Expropriated
Enterprises, 7 J. INT'L ARB. 37 (1990).
96. Under Article 1129, non-disputing NAFTA states are entitled to receive
copies of "the evidence that has been tendered to the Tribunal; and.., the written
argument of the disputing parties." They are thus able to remain informed of the
interpretations relied upon by the disputants.
97. NAFTA Art. 1128.
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the tribunal could certainly allow Party observations in that form.
A Party's right to intervene may be a mixed blessing for a
claimant. NAFTA Parties are unlikely to endorse interpretations and
theories of recovery that enlarge their own exposure to claims. Their
involvement in the process is nonetheless to be welcomed. During
the seminal stages of NAFTA investment jurisprudence, Party
submissions that agree on an interpretative point will presumably be
helpful to the tribunal. And such submissions may provide an
important check upon fanciful theories of recovery or treaty
interpretations proffered by only one NAFTA Party.
In Metalclad, the principal method by which the Parties
participated was filing, simultaneously with the disputing parties,
post-hearing briefs-a subject that this Article now addresses.
XIII. Post-Hearing Briefs
A. In General
Leading rule texts do not address specifically the question of
post-hearing briefs. The simultaneous exchange of such memoranda
is nevertheless a common practice. The structure and content of post-
hearing submissions will vary with circumstances, although it is not
unusual for the tribunal to guide the parties by suggesting topics that
remain underdeveloped. Length limits and narrow deadlines may
accompany the tribunal's invitation to address it in writing a final
time.
B. The Advantages and Disadvantages
A post-hearing submission, if allowed, also provides an
opportunity for a party to supply its views on the proper allocation of
costs, typically a matter decided in the tribunal's award. Although a
common feature of the process, post-hearing submissions are not
welcomed by all tribunals in all circumstances; counsel, too, must
weigh the potential advantages and perils. For example, while
additional memoranda may allow a disputant to encapsulate its case
in a manner that regains momentum lost at the hearing, both sides
will have that opportunity, and neither has in principle either a
clarifying or correcting last word. Moreover, such submissions
prolong the arbitration, defer the ultimate award, and add to costs. If
the tribunal accedes to the procedure based on the request of only
one party, that party's failure to add appreciably to the tribunal's
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understanding of the case may be reflected in its allocation of costs.
From the tribunal's position, allowing some kind of
circumscribed additional writing may on balance be beneficial. The
disputing parties will likely be further inclined to consider that they
have received a fair opportunity to present their respective cases, a
sense of the process that discourages subsequent attacks on the
award. In a complicated case, the parties' distillations may add to the
common ground and may organize, in a coherent way, otherwise
diffuse testimonial and documentary evidence.
XIV. The Award
A. In General
The standard model of arbitral practice contemplates that when
the tribunal consists of three arbitrators, following the parties' final
submissions, the arbitrators will engage in private and confidential
deliberations during which each brings an independent and impartial
assessment of the case to bear in collaborating toward a final
outcome. Agreement by two of the three is required to form the
award and, at least under some rules, a dissenting arbitrator is
entitled to issue a dissenting opinion."
B. Awards As Reasoned Instruments
Unlike the practice evident in some U.S. commercial sectors,
Chapter Eleven proceedings lead to reasoned awards. The beneficial
aspects of reasoned awards are several. They provide guidance to the
parties, thus facilitating more informed policy development or
business planning. They require the tribunal to advance detailed
support for its rulings, thus discouraging awards arising merely out of
a general sense of the equities. Finally, when authoritative, they help
98. Article 53(2) of the Additional Facility Rules provides in pertinent part that
"[a]ny member may attach his individual opinion to the award, whether he dissents
from the majority or not, or a statement of his dissent." The parallel provision within
the ICSID Rules is Rule 47(3). Like many rule texts, the UNCITRAL Arbitration
Rules are silent on the questions of separate and dissenting opinions, which
nonetheless have been a standard feature of Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal Awards. See
generally CHARLES BROWER & JASON BRUESCHKE, THE IRAN-UNrrED STATES
CLAIMS TRIBUNAL 641 (1998); cf. GEORGE ALDRICH, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE
IRAN-UNrIED STATES CLAIMS TRIBuNAL 235 (1996) (analysis of a colleague's
separate opinion).
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
develop the law and inform future tribunals facing similar issues.'
Ironically, the disadvantage of reasoned awards is that the endeavor
that leads to the above-cited benefits adds cost and sometimes
considerable delay to the process.' °°
XV. Enforcing and Attacking the Award
Not unlike adjudication in general, the international arbitral
mechanism is characterized by a tension between the competing
values of finality and quality control. Any possibilities for post-award
maneuvers delaying the effects of res judicata detract from finality;
however, to the extent that procedural and substantive review is
lacking, the potential for injustice enlarges. Influenced greatly by the
New York Convention, modem international commercial arbitration
law generally strikes the balance in favor of finality, provided a
modicum of jurisdictional and procedural integrity characterized the
proceeding in question. The bases for refusing enforcement of a
Convention award relate primarily to procedural irregularities and
arbitral competency, rather than to substantive errors. 1°1
99. As a matter of juridical formality, no system of precedent operates in
international arbitral jurisprudence. Awards bind only the disputing parties. At
present, the publication of awards is unpredictable. A regime designed to
systematically inform decision-makers would thus require less haphazard publication
and collection of awards than has traditionally occurred. When published, the more
learned expositions of law and reasoning to be found therein tend to enjoy influence
in subsequent proceedings. NAFTA jurisprudence being embryonic, the question of
publication would therefore seem to have significant implications for legal
development. NAFTA Article 1137 and Annex 1137.4 address that issue, although in
a fragmented manner. In the Annex, Canada and the United States each authorize
publication of the awards involving them as parties. Mexico, by contrast, posits that
when it is a disputing party, the governing arbitration rules apply to publication of the
award. Yet the seemingly relevant Additional Facility provisions, Articles 53 and 54,
are silent regarding publication. The ICSID Arbitration Rules, Article 48(5),
preclude ICSID from publishing the award without the parties' consent; no
restriction, however, is imposed upon a party's publication of an award. The
UNCITRAL Rules state that "the award may be made public only with the consent
of both parties," though in context, that provision arguably applies only to the
tribunal, since the other six paragraphs of that article are clearly directed to the
tribunal. See UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, art. 32(5). Consistent with the earlier
discussion regarding confidentiality, supra notes 68-71 and accompanying text, no
prohibition upon a disputing party's publication of the award-even when Mexico is
a party to the dispute-can be gleaned from the governing texts.
100. Tribunals are composed of professionals whose services are in demand. The
give and take of the drafting process, combined with tribunal members' competing
obligations, may account for several months.
101. The formulation found in the New York Convention's article V has been
replicated, with minor adjustments, in the Model Law, supra note 39. That text forms
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For awards falling under the ICSID Convention, the internal
annulment proceedings unique to that treaty serve the primary
quality control function i' since, under the Convention, domestic
courts are allowed only immunity from execution as a basis for not
enforcing an award."° The fact that some awards have been annulled
under that Convention, understandably, has given rise to
apprehension on the parts of certain participants and potential
participants." Indeed, the uncertainty that the annulment
mechanism engenders may be one influence causing a Chapter
Eleven claimant to select UNCITRAL Rules arbitration when
eventually the alternative becomes a proceeding under the ICSID
Convention."5
NAFTA's investment arbitration scheme as it relates to the
award relies substantially upon the existing treaty framework,
principally the New Yorki' and ICSID (Washington) Conventions.
the basis of statutes in approximately thirty jurisdictions, including Canada (separate
provincial statutes and federal enactment) and Mexico; it uses the Convention-like
grounds to both test set-aside motions (Model Law, art. 34) and to assess award
enforcement actions (Model Law, art. 36). A relatively current list of Model Law
states can be found at THE FRESHFIELDS GUIDE TO ARBrrRATION AND ADR 163 (2d.
ed. 1999). The public policy exception offers the greatest potential for substantive
vetting. But in practice it has been read narrowly. See, e.g., V. V. Veeder, The New
York Convention in Common Law Countries and the European Union, in ASA, THE
NEw YORK CONVENTION OF 1958, at 117, 126 (Conference Proceedings) ("To my
knowledge, no English Court has ever refused to enforce or recognize a foreign
arbitration award on the ground of public policy. Under English law generally,
public policy is a narrow ground of defence . . . ."); see also PRINCIPLES AND
PRACTICE, supra note 31, at 343-45 (surveying American case law as of mid-1996,
concluding inter alia that public policy is not implicated by a mere misapplication of
the law).
102. ICSID Convention, supra note 37, art. 52
103. Id., art. 55.
104. See generally Aron Broches, Observations on the Finality of ICSID Awards, 6
ICSID REV. 321 (1991); W. Lawrence Craig, The Final Chapter in the Pyramids Case:
Discounting an ICSID Award for Annulment Risk, 8 ICSID REv. 264 (1993).
105. The present pattern of ICSID Convention membership among the NAFTA
Parties precludes resort to arbitration under the Convention. Thus, Chapter Eleven
claimants do not now encounter the dilemma. See supra note 36.
106. There are situations that the Inter-American (Panama) Convention would
apply rather than the New York Convention. Mexico and the United States are
Panama Convention participants; the U.S. reservation to the Panama Convention,
apparently not altered under NAFTA, states that when the New York and Panama
Conventions both ostensibly apply, the New York Convention will govern unless a
majority of the disputing parties "are citizens of a state or states that have ratified or
acceded to the Inter-American Convention and are member states of the [OECD]."
See U.S. Reservation to Inter-American Convention on International Commercial
Arbitration (done at Panama, Jan. 30, 1975), reprinted in PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE,
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Consequently, the pattern of award-related activities following a
Chapter Eleven award ought not to vary greatly from the norm.
Thus, as would be the case under modern rule criteria generally,
perceived clerical errors and similar matters may be submitted to the
tribunal for reconsideration."8 Under the Additional Facility and
UNCITRAL options, actions to set aside1" the award are directed to
the courts of the situs; enforcement of the award can be pursued
directly at the situs, or elsewhere under the relevant convention.
Despite the standard pattern that the NAFTA's drafters
apparently envisioned, the interface between the NAFTA and the
New York and Panama Conventions might give rise to interesting
interpretive questions. For example, NAFTA Article 1136 provides
that "a disputing party shall abide by and comply with an award
without delay." In pursuit of an exceedingly summary enforcement
proceeding, an award recipient might argue that by this provision the
losing NAFTA Party has waived any right to either seek vacatur of
the award or to resist enforcement under the grounds found, for
example, under Article V of the New York Convention. The facial
appeal of the view is diluted by that Article's paragraph 3(b) which, in
regulating the timing of enforcement, expressly contemplates that a
dissatisfied disputant might attack a Chapter Eleven award in a
domestic court. By parity of reasoning, convention refusal grounds
should also be available to a disputant, though no express mention is
made of such grounds in the NAFTA1 °
supra note 31 at 861,864.
107. The authors say "ought not" because the enforcement machinery related to a
Chapter Eleven award has yet to be tested.
108. See, e.g., Additional Facility Rules, supra note 37, arts. 56 (interpretation of
the award), 57 (correction of the award).
109. "Set aside," "annul," and "vacate" are equivalent terms referring to award
nullification, typically through domestic court proceedings applying statutory and,
occasionally, non-statutory grounds.
110. That is, references to enforcement under the New York and Inter-American
Conventions must impliedly incorporate the refusal grounds to which the
enforcement provisions are ordinarily subject. In particular, it is difficult to imagine
that the NAFTA Parties wished to leave no defense to enforcement when a tribunal
manifestly exceeds its power by, for example, awarding punitive damages in violation
of NAFTA Article 1135(3). One would expect that any such relinquishment of
sovereign protection--especially by a departure from the existing operation of the
arbitration conventions-would have been plainly set out in the NAFTA. Moreover,
the alignment with the ICSID Convention that might be said to follow from the
supposed waiver of refusal grounds is fictitious because the ICSID Convention,
though establishing no list of refusal grounds available to domestic courts, has
internal annulment provisions that provide an analogous quality control function.
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XVI. Epilogue: Some Thoughts on Beneficial Tinkering
Although the present Chapter Eleven framework for the
resolving of investor claims enjoys the traditional benefits associated
with international arbitration, it carries the encumbrances of
arbitration as well. It is adversarial, costly, time-consuming, and
ultimately produces a winner and a corresponding loser, even in close
cases in which both sides may have had more to gain by constructing
a via media. The authors would endorse, therefore, a formalized
requirement that the parties pursue mediation before resorting to
arbitration.' The potential benefits of a properly structured
mediation requirement would be numerous; its potential detriments,
by contrast, would be few and tolerable."
Institutionalizing pre-arbitration mediation would make
involvement in that process predictable and neither side would fear
the perception of weakness some associate with unilateral proposals
to collaborate. Even if in a given case settlement is not achieved,
mediation often clarifies the underlying issues. Moreover, partial
settlements-whether formalized or not-may lead to a narrowing of
the claims later presented to the arbitral tribunal, thus generating
efficiencies throughout the arbitral proceedings. Existing procedural
texts could be adopted with few changes, perhaps affording a choice
paralleling that seen in the arbitration provisions."
For those disputants determined to obtain an award, a pre-
arbitration mediation requirement would compromise that objective
Thus, equivalence among the three regimes actually requires that the refusal grounds
remain operational.
111. The duty to pursue mediation would be triggered by the filing of the notice of
intent to file a claim under Article 1119. The mediator would be selected by ICSID
and would be someone whose reputation would merit the respect of both disputants.
112. The potential for the process being abused by a tendentious disputant would
be limited by placing a time limit on the exercise, waivable by the parties. The
ninety-day waiting period is already built into the Chapter Eleven process; under
Article 1119, mediation would occur during that period. The three year statute of
limitations established under Articles 1116(2) and 1117(2) would be tolled during the
mediation process, an effect that can be achieved without substantially amending
existing provisions. The added cost detriment would seem to be outweighed by the
potential for monumental cost savings in those cases where the process succeeds in
settling the dispute.
113. The UNCITRAL Conciliation Rules (1981) are an obvious candidate for use.
They are reprinted in PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE, supra note 31, at 545. So too are
the Additional Facility's Conciliation Rules, reprinted in ICSID, ADDrIONAL
FACILITY FOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF CONCILIATION, ARBITRATION AND FACT-
FINDING PROCEEDINGS, Sched. B (June 1979) Doc. No. ICSID/I11.
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only to the extent permitted by that party. Nothing, however, would
prevent the parties from inviting the same mediator to reconvene
them, for instance, after the first round of written submissions,
submissions to which the mediator would have been privy. Indeed, in
shadow mediation style,"' the mediator could be retained by the
parties for the duration of the proceedings, so that even post-hearing
collaboration could occur.115
Ultimately, the success of such an initiative will depend more
upon the quality of persons appointed to serve as mediators than
upon the procedures chosen.116 The authors would favor a panel
whose members were both familiar with mediation technique and, by
training and reputation, able to offer authoritative substantive
evaluation during the process.
114. See generally J. Peter, Med-Arb in International Arbitration, 8 AM. REV. OF
INT'L ARB 75 (1997).
115. Where the amount in controversy is large, the additional costs of employing
the shadow mediator might seem particularly warranted when compared to the risks
of the win-lose format characterizing arbitration.
116. The authors do not presume that the domestic mediation model developed in
the United States can successfully be adopted without adaptation for investor-state
disputes. Cf. W. A. Wright, Mediation of Private United States-Mexico Disputes: Will
It Work?, 26 N.M. L. REV. 57, 60-70 (1996) (discussing the importance of respected
insiders and intercession in Mexican culture). Mediation, if nothing else, is inherently
flexible. It also has a rich tradition in many societies. See generally KIMBERLEE
KOVACH, MEDIATION PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE 25-26 (2d ed. 2000). This includes,
if incipiently, Latin American countries. See C. Hehring Netto, Is There an
Expanding Culture That Favours Combining Arbitration, Conciliation or Other
Dispute Resolution Procedures?, in ICCA, INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION:
TOWARDS AN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATON CuLTURE 133,135 (J. van den Berg ed.,
1996) ("The culture of alternative dispute resolution schemes is spreading in Latin
America, even if still somewhat hesitantly.").
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